The French Political Ongoing Crisis: The Beginning of a New Political Reality
In October 2022, as Rishi Sunak assumed office as British prime minister, he was the fifth consecutive UK leader to occupy the position in six years.
Unleashed on the UK by Brexit, this signified unprecedented political turmoil. So how might we describe what is unfolding in France, now on its sixth premier in 24 months – three of them in the past 10 months?
The latest prime minister, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on Tuesday, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in exchange for support from Socialist lawmakers as the cost of his government’s survival.
But it is, in the best case, a short-term solution. The EU’s second-largest economy is locked in a ongoing governmental crisis, the likes of which it has not experienced for many years – possibly not since the start of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no easy escape.
Minority Rule
Essential context: from the moment Macron called an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, France has had a divided assembly split into three opposing factions – left, far right and his own centrist coalition – without any group holding a clear majority.
Simultaneously, the country faces twin financial emergencies: its national debt level and deficit are now almost twice the EU threshold, and strict legal timelines to approve a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are approaching.
In this challenging environment, both the prime ministers before Lecornu – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.
In September, the leader named his close ally Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu unveiled his new cabinet – which proved to be largely unchanged from before – he encountered anger from both supporters and rivals.
To such an extent that the next day, he stepped down. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in modern French history. In a respectful address, he cited political rigidity, saying “party loyalties” and “certain egos” would make his job all but impossible.
A further unexpected development: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for another 48 hours in a final attempt to salvage cross-party backing – a task, to put it gently, not without complications.
Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the embattled president. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and radical left France Unbowed (LFI) declined to engage with Lecornu, promising to vote down all future administrations unless there were snap elections.
Lecornu persisted in his duties, engaging with all willing listeners. At the end of his 48 hours, he went on TV to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to prevent a vote. The president’s office confirmed the president would name a fresh premier two days later.
Macron kept his promise – and on Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So recently – with Macron commenting from the wings that the country’s rival political parties were “creating discord” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Could he survive – and can he pass that vital budget?
In a high-stakes speech, the young prime minister outlined his financial plans, giving the Socialist party, who detest Macron’s controversial pension changes, what they were expecting: Macron’s key policy would be frozen until 2027.
With the right-wing LR already on board, the Socialists said they would refuse to support censorship votes proposed against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the government should survive those votes, scheduled for Thursday.
It is, however, by no means certain to be able to approve its €30bn austerity budget: the PS clearly stated that it would be seeking more concessions. “This move,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is just the start.”
Changing Political Culture
The problem is, the greater concessions he makes to the left, the more opposition he'll face from the right. And, similar to the Socialists, the right-leaning parties are themselves split on dealing with the administration – some are still itching to topple it.
A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how difficult his mission – and future viability – will be. A combined 264 lawmakers from the far-right RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR seek his removal.
To succeed, they need a majority of 288 votes in parliament – so if they can persuade just 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in 24 months is, similar to his forerunners, finished.
Few would bet against that happening sooner rather than later. Even if, by some miracle, the dysfunctional assembly musters collective will to pass a budget by year-end, the outlook afterward look bleak.
So is there a way out? Snap elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: surveys indicate pretty much every party bar the RN would see reduced representation, but there would still be no clear majority. A fresh premier would confront identical numerical challenges.
An alternative might be for Macron himself to resign. After winning the presidential election, his replacement would dissolve parliament and hope to secure a parliamentary majority in the following election. But this also remains unclear.
Surveys show the future president will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an odds-on chance that French electorate, having elected a far-right president, might think twice about handing them control of parliament.
In the end, France may not escape its predicament until its leaders accept the new political reality, which is that decisive majorities are a bygone phenomenon, absolute victory is obsolete, and compromise is not synonymous with failure.
Numerous observers believe that cultural shift will not be feasible under the existing governmental framework. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.
“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and even disincentivizes – the emergence of governing coalitions typical across Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”